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Abstract. The social implications of algorithmic decision-making in sensitive contexts have
generated lively debates among multiple stakeholders, such as moral and political philoso-
phers, computer scientists, and the public. Yet, the lack of a common language and a
conceptual framework for an appropriate bridging of the moral, technical, and political as-
pects of the debate prevents the discussion to be as effective as it can be. Social scientists
and psychologists are contributing to this debate by gathering a wealth of empirical data,
yet a philosophical analysis of the social implications of algorithmic decision-making remains
comparatively impoverished. In attempting to address this lacuna, this paper argues that a
hierarchy of different types of explanations for why and how an algorithmic decision outcome
is achieved can establish the relevant connection between the moral and technical aspects of
algorithmic decision-making. In particular, I offer a multi-faceted conceptual framework for
the explanations and the interpretations of algorithmic decisions, and I claim that this frame-
work can lay the groundwork for a focused discussion among multiple stakeholders about the
social implications of algorithmic decision-making, as well as AI governance and ethics more
generally.
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1 Introduction
Governments and private actors are applying the most recent wave of AI, deep learning al-
gorithms, in high-stake decisions.1 These algorithms resolve several critical decision-making
problems such as hiring employees, assigning loans and credit scores, making medical diag-
noses, and dealing with criminal recidivism.2 Hence, the deployed algorithms have begun to
influence several aspects of our social lives. However, since these algorithms are opaque, one
proposed approach towards legitimizing the incorporation of algorithms in several decision-
making processes has been to require the algorithms to explain themselves.3
Building AI systems that are able to explain themselves (so-called “explainable AI”) is
motivated by several reasons: to increase the societal acceptance of the outcomes of algo-
rithmic decisions, to establish trust in the results of these decisions (e.g., if one plans to take
action based on an algorithm’s prediction), to make algorithms accountable to the public, to
validate these decisions, and to facilitate a fruitful conversation among different stakeholders
concerning the justification of using these algorithms for decision-making. Therefore, the
demands for AI systems that can explain their decisions is growing. These AI explanations
are algorithmically generated, latch onto reality, and can be interpreted and understood by
humans. But what is explainability and interpretability?
Computer scientists have suggested that AI explainability and interpretability are not
1This enterprise is motivated by the fact that context-sensitive decision-making can be thought to be an
instance of performing algorithmic tasks such as pattern recognition, classification, or clustering.
2Federico Cabitza, Raffaele Rasoini, and Gian Franco Gensini (2017). “Unintended consequences of machine
learning in medicine”. In: Jama 318.6, pp. 517–518, Julia Angwin et al. (2016). Machine Bias: there’s
software used across the country to predict future criminals. and it’s biased against blacks. ProPublica 2016,
Bala´zs Bodo´ et al. (2017). “Tackling the algorithmic control crisis-the technical, legal, and ethical challenges
of research into algorithmic agents”. In: Yale Journal of Law & Technology 19, p. 133, Michael Veale and
Lilian Edwards (2018). “Clarity, surprises, and further questions in the Article 29 Working Party draft
guidance on automated decision-making and profiling”. In: Computer Law & Security Review 34.2, pp. 398–
404.
3The scope of AI in this paper is limited to deep supervised learning algorithms, due to the fact that the
deployment of these algorithms in critical decision-making contexts has mainly motivated the recent concerns
about the explainability and interpretability of AI. Although I find the discussions relevant, I do not directly
address explainability and interpretability of logic-based symbolic manipulation paradigms, unsupervised, or
non-supervised learning algorithms.
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monolithic concepts, and are used in different ways by these scientists.4 One promising ap-
proach for gaining conceptual clarification is to seek inspirations from philosophy about what
an explanation is, and how an explanation relates to interpretation and understanding. This
paper aims to achieve this goal. Thus far, the inspiration-seeking approach from philosophy
has mainly focused on elucidating what the data-driven, causal aspects of an explanation
are. For instance, in the most extensive survey in this area, Miller entirely dismisses the
non-causal aspects of explanations:5
But what constitutes an explanation? This question has created a lot of debate in
philosophy, but accounts of explanation both philosophical and psychology [sic]
stress the importance of causality in explanation — that is, an explanation refers
to causes [...]. There are, however, definitions of non-causal explanation [...].
These definitions [are] out of scope in this paper, and they present a different set
of challenges to explainable AI.
In a similar vein, Mittelstadt limit the discussion of explainable AI to causal investiga-
tions:6
Returning to philosophy, types of explanations can be distinguished according to
their completeness, or the degree to which the entire causal chain and necessity of
an event can be explained [...]. Often this is expressed as the difference between
‘scientific’ and ‘everyday’ explanations (both of which deal with causes of an event;
e.g. Miller (2018), or ‘scientific’ (full) and ‘ordinary’ (partial) causal explanations
[...].
In this paper, I take an explanation to be a response to a why-question,7 and to be
4Zachary C Lipton (2016). “The mythos of model interpretability”. In: arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.03490,
Finale Doshi-Velez and Been Kim (2017). “Towards a rigorous science of interpretable machine learning”.
In: arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.08608.
5Tim Miller (2018). “Explanation in artificial intelligence: Insights from the social sciences”. In: Artificial
Intelligence 267, pp. 1–38.
6Brent Mittelstadt, Chris Russell, and Sandra Wachter (2019). “Explaining explanations in AI”. in: Proceed-
ings of the conference on fairness, accountability, and transparency. ACM, pp. 279–288.
7Sylvain Bromberger (1966). “Why-Questions”. In: Mind and cosmos: Essays in contemporary science and
philosophy. Ed. by Robert G Colodny, pp. 86–111.
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somehow (empirically or mathematically) true. I set out to satisfy three objectives.
First, in Section 2, I argue that in the context of AI explanations, it is useful to distin-
guish between minimalist and maximalist conceptions of explanation. The former involves
a variety of explanations, understandable by a specific group of people, about how black
box AI make decisions.8 The latter involves taking up insights from data analysis as well as
the technical and mathematical processes by which an algorithm is governed, and through
which the decision outcome is generated. While the minimalist view has been the main
focus of the explainable AI discussion, I argue that we might ultimately move beyond min-
imalist conceptions of explanation if the aim of explainable AI is to increase the societal
acceptance of algorithmic decisions, establish trust in the results of these decisions, and fa-
cilitate a fruitful conversation among different stakeholders on the justification of using these
algorithms for decision-making. By incorporating some insights about non-data driven and
mathematical aspects of explanation, rooted in the recent philosophical literature, I argue
for the significance of mathematical, statistical, and optimality explanations.9 I show how
these explanations are helpful in addressing some important normative questions about the
social use of AI decision-making. Hence, while I acknowledge the significance of data-driven
information in some types of explanations, I argue that a comprehensive discussion about
AI decision-making requires the identification of two additional explanations that are non-
data driven, and are crucial to explaining why and how an algorithmic decision outcome
is achieved: (1) the mathematical structures that underlie the representation of a decision-
making situation, and (2) the statistical and optimality facts in terms of which the machine
learning algorithm is designed and implemented.
8In Section 4, I discuss the significance of the multiplicity of human’s background assumptions to the goal of
generating explanations.
9Angela Potochnik (2007). “Optimality modeling and explanatory generality”. In: Philosophy of Science
74.5, pp. 680–691, Alisa Bokulich (2011). “How scientific models can explain”. In: Synthese 180.1, pp. 33–
45, Robert W Batterman and Collin C Rice (2014). “Minimal model explanations”. In: Philosophy of
Science 81.3, pp. 349–376, Marc Lange (2016). Because without cause: Non-causal explanations in science
and mathematics. Oxford University Press, Mazviita Chirimuuta (2017). “Explanation in computational
neuroscience: Causal and non-causal”. In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69.3, pp. 849–
880, Alexander Reutlinger and Juha Saatsi (2018). Explanation beyond causation: philosophical perspectives
on non-causal explanations. Oxford University Press.
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Second, in Section 3, I argue that a properly focused conversation about the societal,
moral, and political impacts of algorithmic decision-making requires the acknowledgement
of two pluralities: (i) the plurality of why-questions: there are different why-questions to
ask about a particular decision outcome, and (ii) the plurality of explanatory responses:
there are different responses to a particular why-question. Accordingly, I propose a more
philosophically-informed explanatory schema in which a variety of data-driven and non-data
driven information find their place in explaining AI decisions.10 The explanatory schema
is composed of different levels of explanation, and is sorted in ascending order of locality
from the most non-data driven and structurally global to the most data-driven and local
explanations.
Third, in Section 4, I discuss how background assumptions (such as goals and norms)
held by the audiences of explanations can influence interpretations of the explanations. This
suggests that the explanations for a given decision might be diverse in relation to differ-
ent precedent assumptions of an audience. Accordingly, I propose an interpretation schema
that stands in relation to the explanatory hierarchy. Each level of the interpretation schema
incorporates a set of background assumptions held by the audience of an explanation that
is required for understanding and interpreting an explanation. Hence, each level of the in-
terpretation schema corresponds to a certain level of the explanatory hierarchy. The two
explanatory hierarchy and interpretation schema lay out a conceptual framework for bring-
ing a unified focus to the conversation among different stakeholders concerning the social
implications of algorithmic decision-making. Such a conversation could include, but is not
limited to, the critical assessment and analysis of the implicit moral, political, and technical
assumptions embedded in the employment of an AI system in a particular sensitive decision
context. The paper closes with some concluding remarks in Section 5.
10To capture the many differences and similarities pertaining to explainability and interpretability, I distinguish
between the two issues. I take explanations to track some true facts about the world. Interpretations
depend on the audiences’ background assumptions for explanatory judgements. First, I treat these two
issues separately (Sections 3 and 4), and then I bring them together (Section 5).
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2 Mathematical decisions: structure, statistics, and optimiza-
tion
Let us consider a machine-learning algorithm that sifts through several job applications to
recommend a future employee for company X. Nora, a competent candidate, applies for the
job. Her application gets rejected by the algorithmic decision. Nora wants to know why she is
rejected (Figure 1). She does not seek a just-so-story that somehow makes sense by organizing
events into an intelligible whole. She wants the explanation to have factual foundations and
to be somehow (empirically or mathematically) true.
Algorithm
decides
Reject Nora
why?
Figure 1: Algorithm decides and a why-question.
This decision-making problem is an exemplar of the social difficulties that might be re-
solved using a machine-learning algorithm. Although there are many different kinds of learn-
ing algorithms, such as supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement algorithms. In what
follows, I will only focus on explanations in the context of deep supervised learning. This
assumption is also justified on the ground that several critical decision-making problems are
instances of classification or regression, two tasks performed by supervised learning algo-
rithms.11 A brief review of the basics of deep supervised learning and the networks on which
these algorithms learn facilitates the rest of our discussion. Through the statistical and op-
timality analysis of a massive corpus of data, without receiving explicit rules, supervised
learning algorithms are able to learn about some structures and interrelations within the
data. Using this learned information, they make predictions or determinations about new
data. A supervised learning algorithm is trained on a large data set of input-output pairs.
The output elements are taken to be the right answers generated by an unknown function
g(x). A supervised algorithm seeks to find a hypothesis function f(x) that approximates
the alleged true function g(x). The algorithm learns and generates f(x) by estimating new
11It should be noted that these insights with respect to classification and regression can be generalized and
extended to other learning algorithms.
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parameters for several interactions among input features. This estimation is usually cached
out in terms of the (total) minimization of some error as the difference among the data points
of a given corpus and f(x). The algorithm then uses f(x) to predict and recommend outputs
for new input data. Figure 2 illustrates a more fine-grained characterization of Figure 1,
where a supervised learning algorithm is situated in a decision context and the why-question
about the implemented algorithmic outcome arises.
Training data
(xi,yi)
i = 1, 2, . . . , n
Learning
process
Learned function
fˆ(x)
Outcome
fˆ(x′)
New input
x′
Reject
Nora
why?
Figure 2: Supervised machine learning and a why-question.
This sketch illustrates the algorithmic elements that give rise to a decision outcome.
Related to Nora’s hiring example, the algorithm is designed to optimize some success criteria,
such as minimizing cost, for a chosen target variable. Then, if employee turnover is costly, a
good employee might be defined as one who is likely to stay at the company for a long time.
In other words, the target variable is longevity.
We can now list a set of five explanatory questions that provide a more fine-grained
questionnaire for why Nora is rejected. Responding to each of these questions provides infor-
mation for why Nora is rejected: (1) What is a causal explanation, rooted in data analysis, of
Nora’s rejection? That is, what input features, representing Nora, caused Nora’s rejection?
(2) What is a correlational explanation, rooted in data analysis, for Nora’s rejection? That
is, what input features were correlated with the decision outcome for Nora’s rejection? (3)
What is a statistical and optimization-based explanation for rejecting Nora? That is, what
statistical assumptions and optimality functions during training contributed to determining
the decision-making about Nora’s case? (4) What role does the specific training data set play
in Nora’s rejection? (5) What is the set of Nora’s quantifiable features that contribute to the
algorithmic hiring decision? The plurality of the relevant explanatory questions, therefore,
expands, as Figure 3 illustrates. Responses to the questions (1)–(5) explains maximally, from
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an algorithmic point of view, how and why the particular decision about Nora is obtained.
Training data
(xi,yi)
i = 1, 2, . . . , n
Learning
process
Learned function
fˆ(x)
Outcome
fˆ(x′)
Decision
made
New input
x′
why?
(4
) (3
) (3)
(1
)
(2
)
(5
)
Figure 3: The plurality of why-questions about an algorithmic decision.
Deep supervised learning algorithms usually demonstrate their learning through a high-
dimensional and highly nonlinear function that is incomprehensible for humans. For this
reason, several methods (e.g., models) have been devised to explain why and how these
algorithms generate a particular decision outcome. Thus far, the work on the explainability of
deep supervised learning has largely focused on constructing methods that answer questions of
types (1) or (2): what input features caused Nora’s rejection? What input features correlated
with the decision outcome for Nora’s rejection? These methods reveal that there is a kind
of information rooted in data analysis, whether it is causal, correlational, or contrastive,
about the relationship among the salient features that contribute to the algorithm’s decision
outcome. Roughly, the landscape of research on making AI explainable and interpretable has
been divided into three groups (i)–(iii) based on the kind of explanation that is generated by
these methods.
(i) Correlational explanations reveal some approximation for the relationship among data
points or specific features. These relations might be revealed using a particular model, such as
a linear regression. A linear model approximates how the feature of an instance (e.g., Nora’s
longevity at a work place, or the temperature) is associated with the predicted outcome (e.g.,
Nora’s duration of stay at a job, the number of bikers in the streets). Contrariwise, the
correlational explanations might be obtained in a model-agnostic and local way by tweaking
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the input features and tracing their contributions to output features.12 For instance, without
using a specific model approximating the workings of a deep learning algorithm, a framework
for local data analysis can reveal how Nora’s gender and her previous longevity at a work
place correlates with her hire. A correlational explanation reveals information, as the name
suggests, about the correlation among input features and the outcome of a decision. (ii)
Causal explanations reveal some causal relations among data-points via some sort of causal
modelling.13. For instance, a causal explanation for why Nora was rejected might be that
some of her features, such as her ethnicity, have caused her rejection. (iii) Example-based
explanations, such as counterfactual and prototype explanations, compare and contrast a spe-
cific predicted output by finding similar outputs while changing some of the input features
for which the predicted outcome changes in a relevant way.14 These explanations provide con-
trastive information rooted in data analysis, that is, by providing counterfactual statements
about what would have been needed to be different about an individual’s situation to get a
different, preferred outcome. For instance, Aron, who had a very similar CV to Nora, but
who had a longer job longevity, was granted the job.
Explanations of kind (i)–(iii) reveal causal and correlational information in relation to
the quantified features of an individual. They give responses to the explanatory questions
(1) and (2). However, the responses to these two questions do not fully reveal why this
algorithmic decision outcome is obtained. Merely responding to the questions (1) and (2) do
not satisfy the multiple purposes that the researchers on the explainable and interpretable AI
aim to achieve: to increase societal acceptance of algorithmic decision outcomes, to establish
trust in the results of these decisions, to generate human-level transparency about why a
decision outcome is achieved, and to have a fruitful conversation among different stakeholders
12Marco Tulio Ribeiro, Sameer Singh, and Carlos Guestrin (2016). “Why should i trust you?: Explaining
the predictions of any classifier”. In: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD international conference on
knowledge discovery and data mining. ACM, pp. 1135–1144.
13Qingyuan Zhao and Trevor Hastie (2019). “Causal interpretations of black-box models”. In: Journal of
Business & Economic Statistics, pp. 1–19, Himabindu Lakkaraju and Cynthia Rudin (2017). “Learning
cost-effective and interpretable treatment regimes”. In: Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, pp. 166–175.
14Been Kim, Rajiv Khanna, and Oluwasanmi O Koyejo (2016). “Examples are not enough, learn to criticize!
criticism for interpretability”. In: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pp. 2280–2288, San-
dra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt, and Chris Russell (2017). “Counterfactual Explanations without Opening
the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GPDR”. in: Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 31, p. 841.
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concerning the justification of using these algorithms for decision-making.
In the rest of this section, I argue for the significance of two other kinds of explanations,
in addition to the correlational and causal explanations discussed above. These two kinds of
explanations are framed in terms of mathematical and statistical-optimality rules, which gov-
ern the algorithmic decision procedure and warrant the decision outcome. These explanations
reveal how a decision is achieved due to the structural, statistical, and optimality facts that
constitute the algorithmic process. They give responses to explanatory questions (3)–(5), and
they cast light on the motivation for a maximalist conception of AI explainability. I begin
by defending the importance of structural explanations for algorithmic decision-making.
2.1 Representing on mathematical structures
The producer of an explanation for a given decision stands in a relation with the decision-
making problem. This problem is represented in a particular way using a set of concepts.
Hence, an explanation for a decision outcome is generated employing the elements and con-
cepts by which a decision-making problem is represented. The generated explanation for why
a decision outcome is achieved is the result of an investigation and a reflection on the reasons
for why an algorithmic decision outcome occurred. As the decisions of interest to this paper
are fundamentally represented on the deep neural network structure, I first say a few words
about the mathematical structure of deep neural networks.
In a successful incarnation, deep learning algorithms represent the problem according to
the framework of artificial neural networks.15 These networks are inspired by the topological
structure and function of the human brain’s architecture. Artificial neural networks are
composed of a set of connected nodes (neurons) and a set of arcs that connect the nodes and
transfer signals among them. These nodes and arcs are organized into multi-layers. Typically,
an artificial neural network has an input layer, an output layer, and multiple layers between
the input and output layers. An artificial neural network is deep if there are many hidden
layers between input and output layers. Each node of the input layer represents an individual
feature from each sample of the training data set. For example, Nora’s length of employment
at her previous jobs, her age, and her education level can be part of a set of input features. A
15Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, and Geoffrey Hinton (2015). “Deep learning”. In: Nature 521.7553, p. 436.
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Education
Age
Longevity
Input 4
Input 5
Hidden
layer 1
Hidden
layer 2
Accept/Reject
Input
layer
Figure 4: A simple sketch of the deep neural network architecture.
numerical weight is associated with each arc which represents the strength of the connection
between the nodes. Corresponding to each node of the deep and output layers, there is
an activation function that receives the sum of the weights into that node and outputs a
value into a neuron in the next layer. Learning occurs when an optimization method such as
gradient descent statistically minimizes an error between the algorithmic outcome and a true
output. Figure 4 illustrates a simplistic sketch of this architecture, with five input features
and two hidden layers.
The deep learning architecture makes an implicit assumption for representing the decision
problem: there is a morphism between the input layer of the mathematical representation and
the source of the input layer data coming from the real world that makes up the significant
elements of the decision-making situation. Using deep neural networks for decision-making
requires that the significant elements of the feature space (e.g., Nora’s features), relevant to
the decision-making situation, should be quantifiable and measurable. To represent some-
thing mathematically is to have clear and distinct ideas about these elements and also the
relation between them: what features are important and relevant? Moreover, instantiating
these algorithms requires making several pragmatic decisions that guarantees the algorithmic
functionality, for instance, how the decision-making configurations should be translated and
reduced into numerical values on the neural network structure (e.g., the link between the
nodes and what the activation function should be).
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Mathematical structure and the form of representation as required by the algorithm gives
a response to the explanatory question (5): What is the set of Nora’s quantifiable features
that contribute to the algorithmic hiring decision? This answer reveals the following: the
precondition for using these algorithms as decision-making tools is to reduce the relevant
features of Nora, as a person, to quantifiable variables, measure them, and then feed them
as the input data to the algorithms. This explanatory answer, as I will argue in details in
Section 3, is tied to the response to the following morally-significant question concerning the
acceptability of this explanation: why does the algorithm merely observe Nora’s attributes
mathematically relevant to the decision-making context?
If the representation of the decision-making situation would be very different (e.g., rep-
resent the decision problem by non-measurable features), we might get a different decision
outcome. Thus far, I have shown that a maximalist view of AI explanations admits that a
part of the explanations for the algorithmic decision outcomes must be framed in terms of
the mathematical structures that characterize the decision-making situation. Having estab-
lished the explanatory relevance of the mathematical representation of the decision-making
situation to algorithmic decision-making, I will now turn to the explanatory role of statistics
and optimization in warranting AI decision outcomes.
2.2 Statistics and optimization
Deep supervised learning algorithms employ some amalgamation of statistical analysis and
optimization in order to predict the probability of the occurrence of an outcome. First, I
begin by a simple example in order to fix the relevant intuitions about the explanatory power
of statistical rules, e.g., the case of pricing in the insurance industry.
Statistical methods are tailored for calculation of risk premiums based on the past be-
haviour of a population, rather than a single individual. The cost of one’s insurance policy
depends on one’s risk. This risk reflects the likelihood of making an insurance claim. The
lower one’s risk is, the lower one’s premium will be. Insurers heavily rely on statistical rules
about the law of large numbers and the related central limit theorem in order to decide
about how much they may have to pay out by calculating the risk premiums.16 For instance,
16The law of large numbers holds that the average of a large number of independent identically distributed
random variables tends to fall close to the expected value. The central limit theorem, roughly, can be stated
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the central limit theorem warrants using the Gaussian distribution for the estimation and
likelihood definition when we consider the sums of independent and identically distributed
random variables. Therefore, the decision outcomes of the deep supervised learning algo-
rithms are partially dependent on statistical rules that are constitutive of learning from data
sets. The law of large numbers and the central limit theorem, as two statistical rules, are
used to explain the pooling of losses as an insurance mechanism, and they explain why an
increase in the number of policyholders strengthens the sustainability of insurance policies
by reducing the probability that the pool will fail.17
Similarly, concerning a supervised learning algorithm such as classification, the explana-
tion for why a tumor is classified as malignant, rather than as benign, is determined by highly
probable similarities to an analyzed statistical sample that suggest the tumor is like the other
malignant tumors. These probabilistic claims are warranted due to accepting probability the-
ory and statistical rules such as the law of large numbers and the central limit theorem as
legitimate tools in drawing an inference. These statistical rules partially govern and influence
the design of the decision procedure, and they therefore are an explanatory element for why
a decision outcome, due to a statistical inference, is achieved. Back to Nora’s rejection, the
outcome recommendation is obtained based on the warranted statistical path (e.g., a specific
Gaussian distribution). Having briefly established the explanatory relevance of statistical
facts in relation to an algorithmic decision outcome, I now move on to make a case for the
constitutive explanatory role of mathematical optimization for machine learning decisions.
Most supervised learning algorithms are based on optimizing a particular objective func-
tion. Let us discuss in details how mathematics becomes constitutive of the decision-making
situation in the optimization step. First, mathematics is used in a variety of ways during the
training of an artificial neural network. To train an artificial neural network is to resolve an
optimization problem. For supervised learning algorithms, resolving an optimization prob-
lem on the deep neural networks often means having to calculate the weights on the arcs
as follows: if X, a random variable, is the sum of a large number of independent and identically distributed
random variables, then no matter how the identically distributed variables are distributed, X would have a
Gaussian distribution.
17Michael L Smith and Stephen A Kane (1994). “The law of large numbers and the strength of insurance”.
In: Insurance, risk management, and public policy. Springer, pp. 1–27.
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of the network such that a total loss function defined for the network is minimized. The
loss function is a mathematical function, such as mean squared error 1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − fˆ(xi))
2, that
minimizes the difference between what the computed output should be and what the model
has predicted. The minimization of a loss function happens by continuously updating the
weights. The total loss of the network is the sum of the loss over all output layer nodes, or
the composition of all loss functions on the nodes of the output layer. The most frequently
used optimizer for minimizing the loss function in artificial neural networks is the stochastic
gradient descent. This method updates the weights on the arcs of the network by calculating
the gradient (derivative) of the loss function for each weight. The calculation is done by back
propagation.18
Back propagation itself is based on four fundamental mathematical equations.19 Why
should we trust these equations rather than other equations? Because we can mathematically
prove that the equations are true. In other words, we can prove that these equations are all
consequences of the chain rule from multivariable calculus. Hence, mathematical proofs
guarantee the efficiency of the use of back propagation for a decision-making problem. This
suggests that if some optimality facts warrant that an algorithm can mathematically arrive at
a decision, they are required to be used in an (maximalist) explanation for why this decision
outcome is obtained.
In what follows, I briefly discuss two potential limits of statistical and optimality thinking
styles for making decisions. These limits show that if a different non-statistical style of
thinking is used for a decision-making situation, the decision outcome might be different.
First, humans are more efficient in learning abstractions through explicit, verbal defini-
tions.20 Deep learning lacks such a learning capability. Therefore, deep supervised decision-
making is different from human decision-making, if humans base their decision-making on
thinking styles that are based on learning through explicit, verbal definitions. Second, it is
not straightforward how deep learning algorithms can incorporate prior knowledge into their
reasoning style. As mentioned earlier, deep algorithms typically learn on a training database,
18David E Rumelhart, Geoffrey E Hinton, Ronald J Williams, et al. (1988). “Learning representations by
back-propagating errors”. In: Cognitive modeling 5.3, p. 1.
19Michael A Nielsen (2015). Neural networks and deep learning. Determination Press.
20Gary Marcus (2018). “Deep learning: A critical appraisal”. In: arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.00631.
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in which there are sets of inputs associated with respective outputs. These algorithms learn
all that is required for the problem by learning the relations between those inputs and out-
puts, using whatever clever architectural variants one might devise, along with techniques
for cleaning and augmenting the data set. The incorporation of prior knowledge into the
functioning of these algorithms is often missed. While there are decision-making contexts in
which prior knowledge is significant to decision-making by humans, deep learning algorithms
appear incapable of making decisions based on such human reasoning styles. This point will
be clarified in an example shortly.
Of particular importance, too, is the role of human judgement in arriving at a particular
solution to a decision-making problem. Smith distinguishes between two kinds of discernment
capacities that are different between humans and AI systems.21 Smith reserves the term
“reckoning” for the calculative rationality of present-day algorithms. This capability is empty
of any ethical commitment, authenticity, or deep contextual awareness. On the other hand,
the term “judgement” refers to the human capacity to understand the relations between the
appearances and reality in an authentic way that grounds one’s contextual awareness. This
authentic understanding of the decision-making situation, which an AI lacks, rather than
a calculative mathematical optimization might directly impact how humans might make
a decision, and it might impact the outcome of a human decision-making process. In what
follows, I give a real-life simple example of uniquely human judgemental capacity that I think
highlights how such unique judgemental capacities, due to its authentic features, cannot be
taught to a deep supervised neural network.
In April, 2019, a 96-year-old man, Mr. Coella, was charged with exceeding the speed limit
in a school zone in Rhode Island.22 In court, Mr. Coella explained that he is taking care of
his 63-year-old, handicapped son who has got cancer, and the reason for exceeding the speed
limit is that he had been driving his son to the doctor’s office when his car’s speed exceeded.
The judge, rather than appealing to the laws for ticket-giving to Mr. Coella’s offense case,
decided that Mr. Coella is “a good man”, and that Mr. Coella’s actions are “what America
is all about”. Accordingly, the judge dismissed Mr. Coella’s ticket. It is extremely difficult,
21Brian Cantwell Smith (2019). The promise of Artificial Intelligence. MIT University Press.
22Lee Moran (2019). “Judge Tosses Speeding Ticket Of 96-Year-Old Man Caring For Son With Cancer.” In:
Hoffington Post.
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and perhaps impossible, to assume that the values captured by the “goodness of a man” and
“what America is all about” can be meaningfully quantified and represented on the deep
neural network architecture.
In summary, I have discussed that in addition to data-driven explanations for AI decision
outcomes, there are also non-data driven and non-causal elements of mathematical struc-
ture, statistics, and mathematical optimization that directly influence the outcome of an AI
decision-making problem, and hence explain why a decision outcome is achieved. Due to the
fact that these elements make up the decision-making outcome, they must also be manifest in
the explanations for why a decision is made. Let us say more about how the characterization
of these non-data driven and mathematical explanations can be grounded by looking at the
recent philosophical literature.
2.3 Mathematical explanations
The question of “what is an explanation?” has taken center stage in contemporary philosophy
of science. In particular, philosophers of science have been extensively concerned with the
analysis of explanation ever since Hempel and Oppenheim.23 Roughly, these discussions aim
to answer one of the following three questions. (1) Are explanations reducible to causal
explanations, or are there genuine cases of non-causal explanations? (2) Whether, and if so
how, can we specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for explanations? (3) How do
non-causal explanations work, if they exist at all?
Hempel and Oppenheim offer an account of explanation that emphasizes its argumentative
nature.24 According to that account, explanations have two constituent parts: the thing to be
explained, or explanandum, and the explaining thing, or explanans. Hempel and Oppenheim
stipulate that the explanandum must logically follow from the explanans which contains at
least one law-like generalization. The argumentative nature of explanations generated by AI
systems has been emphasized in the literature by Miller and Mittelstadt, among others.25
23Carl G Hempel and Paul Oppenheim (1948). “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”. In: Philosophy of
Science 15.2, pp. 135–175.
24Carl G Hempel and Paul Oppenheim (1948). “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”. In: Philosophy of
Science 15.2, pp. 135–175, Carl G Hempel (1965). “Aspects of Scientific Explanation; And Other Essays in
the Philosophy of Science”. In:
25Tim Miller (2018). “Explanation in artificial intelligence: Insights from the social sciences”. In: Artificial
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Hempel’s account, however, was too permissive and it allowed for irrelevant generalizations
to be counted as explanations.
Since Hempel, some philosophers have argued that a missing element of an account of
explanation is causal information. Among many, Salmon and Strevens hold that explanations
provide information about causal relations that are out there in the world.26 But this has not
been the end of the story about what information should be included within an explanation.
More recently, the discussion about what explanations are has tilted towards unveiling
the non-causal elements engaged in the production of an explanation such as the explanatory
roles of mathematics.27 A simple example reveals the insights behind these discussions. To
explain why a mother cannot divide 23 strawberries among her three children, one can appeal
to the mathematical fact that 23 cannot be divided 3 evenly. Of particular interest are cases
of optimality explanations in which reference to an optimality notion, such as equilibrium,
is responsible for an explanation of some empirical phenomena such as natural selection.28
Philosophical views about mathematical explanations extend to the explanation in decision-
making sciences as well. Here is an example.
If a linear programming algorithm is used for a nurse scheduling, the reason for why a
particular set of nurse schedules is obtained is partly due to the use of mathematical opti-
mization for solving a linear programming problem such as the simplex method for arriving
at the schedules. In a similar vein, as optimization algorithms are situated at the heart of
machine learning, the producer of an explanation for decision-making needs to refer to the
Intelligence 267, pp. 1–38, Brent Mittelstadt, Chris Russell, and Sandra Wachter (2019). “Explaining
explanations in AI”. in: Proceedings of the conference on fairness, accountability, and transparency. ACM,
pp. 279–288.
26Wesley C Salmon (1984). Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Princeton University
Press, Michael Strevens (2008). Depth: An account of scientific explanation. Harvard University Press.
27Robert W Batterman (2001). The devil in the details: Asymptotic reasoning in explanation, reduction, and
emergence. Oxford University Press, Marc Lange (2016). Because without cause: Non-causal explanations
in science and mathematics. Oxford University Press, Mazviita Chirimuuta (2017). “Explanation in com-
putational neuroscience: Causal and non-causal”. In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
69.3, pp. 849–880.
28Angela Potochnik (2007). “Optimality modeling and explanatory generality”. In: Philosophy of Science
74.5, pp. 680–691, Collin Rice (2015). “Moving beyond causes: Optimality models and scientific explana-
tion”. In: Nouˆs 49.3, pp. 589–615.
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optimization as an important element in shaping the procedure and the outcome of decision-
making. By elucidating the varieties of non-data driven and mathematical explanations, I
have now sufficient resources to propose a hierarchy of different types of explanations for AI
decision-making.
3 The many faces of an AI explanation
The hierarchy of AI explanations, as illustrated in Figure 5, is composed of multiple levels. On
the top level, there is a structural explanation, which reveals why a particular decision output
is generated in virtue of a specific structural mapping of the salient features of a decision-
making situation on to the input layer of the neural network. On a lower level, there is the
statistical and optimality explanation that emphasizes the statistical and optimality laws or
facts engaged in learning and forming the decision-making procedure. These two kinds of
explanations together acknowledge the importance of non-data driven and mathematical ele-
ments that are constitutive and the ground for warranting AI decision outcomes. As we will
discuss shortly, these explanations open a space for asking questions concerning the social,
moral, and political assumptions for algorithmic decision-making. For example, we can ask
about the reductive representation of significant decision-making attributes and the amalga-
mation of statistical and optimality thinking for critical decision-making problems affecting
particular individuals. It is correct that these explanations might not be understandable by a
lay-person. However, this reasoning should not make us dismissive of the significance of these
explanations as to why an algorithmic decision outcome has been achieved. As I elaborate
in Section 4, the importance of understanding the social, moral, and political implications of
AI decision-making prevents us from setting minimal requirements on overall generation of
explanations understandable by lay people, here and now.
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Figure 5: Hierarchical levels of AI explanations.
Although in some cases, the generation of minimal explanations is sufficient in satisfying
the explanatory goals, a maximalist connception of explanation appears more truthworthy
in the assessment of the social implications of AI decision-making. Moving from a maxi-
malist to a minimalist account is simpler than branching out from a minimalist conception
of explanations to several technical elements that determine the algorithmic decision out-
comes. My argument thus does not imply that maximal explanations are required in all
cases of algorithmic decision-making. When the outcome has no significant impact, maximal
explanations might be pointless. However, the framework emphasizes that there are multiple
(empirically or mathematically) true reasons for why an algorithm arrives at a decision out-
come. In critical decision-making contexts in which several politically and morally significant
considerations become relevant, the maximalist conception of explanation is useful.
Recall that explanations are responses to why questions and are somehow, empirically or
mathematically, true. If these explanations encompass statistical laws and rules, or math-
ematical optimization, we acquire mathematical and non-data driven explanations. These
two kinds of explanations open an important yet neglected discourse about the legitimacy
of the (partial) mathematical construction of decision outcomes in sensitive contexts. The
proposed explanatory hierarchy enforces us to convey the explicit and implicit mathematical
and causal assumptions that designers of the algorithms grapple with, as well as the objective
functions in terms of which they design the algorithm.
In descending order of locality, there are three other types of explanation added to the
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hierarchy. These levels correspond to information obtained from the data-analysis (i.e., data-
driven explanations) rather than an emphasis on the mathematical and statistical constitution
of the decision-making process. These are correlational explanations, causal explanations,
and example-based explanations. A hierarchy for data-driven explanations can be extracted
from the discussion of Pearl concerning the hierarchy of causation.29 Therefore, my proposed
hierarchy (Figure 5) can be seen as an extension of Pearl’s hierarchy of causation to different
types of data-based and non-data based explanations for why and how an algorithmic decision
outcome is obtained.
The explanatory schema recommends a pluralistic attitude about explanations: explana-
tions complement each other, and shed light on different aspects of how a decision outcome
is achieved. The complementary rather than the competitive nature of explanations dis-
tances us from discussions about whether one unique AI explanation is the correct one or
not. This attitude is intimately connected to immediate issues about the social implications
of AI decision-making.
Are the receivers of explanations those who design the algorithms, the corporate head
of a private company who has requested the algorithms to decide on an optimally accurate
basis for some decision-making problems, the laypeople who do not have any knowledge of
formal representations and mathematical tools? If so, what kinds of moral and political rules
and values are implicitly acknowledged when an algorithm legitimately decides in sensitive
contexts? Are liberal-democratic, socialistic, or corporate authoritarian rules and values
acknowledged in the justification of these AI decision outcomes? The responses to such
questions reveal the significance of the accepted background assumptions concerning the
algorithmic decision-making. Hence, the explanatory hierarchy has the value of revealing the
significance of explicit and implicit assumptions baked into AI decision-making. This suggests
that each of the explanatory levels (illustrated in Figure 5) is indeed accompanied with some
implicit and explicit background assumptions for their acceptability. If all the background
assumptions required for algorithmic decision-making and the receiver of an explanation are
matched, AI provides successful and effective explanations for an algorithmic outcome.
So far, I have argued that there are several types of explanations conveying various grades
29Judea Pearl (2000). Causality: models, reasoning and inference. Vol. 29. Springer.
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of data-driven, non-data driven, and mathematical information about why and how a deci-
sion outcome is achieved. In the next section, I develop a conceptual framework that ties
the varieties of explanations to the required background assumptions for the explanatory
judgements. Often in the literature, the two concepts of machine-learning explainability and
interpretability are defined in terms of each other. Here are two examples: “In the context of
ML systems, I define interpretability as the ability to explain or to present in understandable
terms to a human.”30 “Explanation is thus one mode in which an observer may obtain under-
standing, but clearly, there are additional modes that one can adopt, such as making decisions
that are inherently easier to understand or via introspection. I equate ‘interpretability’ with
‘explainability’.”31 As we will see, there are good reasons to distinguish these two concepts.
4 Background assumptions and explanatory judgements
The production of explanations about decisions made by AI systems is not the end of the
AI explainability and interpretability debate. The practical value of these explanations,
partly, depends on the audience who consumes them: an explanation must result in an
appropriate level of understanding or some grade of cognitive achievement for the receivers of
explanations. In other words, explanations are required to be interpreted and judged against
different vantage points, about whether they are good or bad, satisfactory or unsatisfactory,
effective or ineffective, acceptable or unacceptable. Among those background assumptions
that impact the judgements of explanations are norms. It has been empirically shown that
norms influence causal judgements.32 To put it simply, norms are informal rules that are
held by people, and can have statistical or prescriptive content. Here is an example of how
a norm can be relevant to the evaluation of an explanation, and yet can disagree with the
explanation.
Let us suppose that I have some strictly deontological commitments for assessing the
30Finale Doshi-Velez and Been Kim (2017). “Towards a rigorous science of interpretable machine learning”.
In: arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.08608.
31Tim Miller (2018). “Explanation in artificial intelligence: Insights from the social sciences”. In: Artificial
Intelligence 267, pp. 1–38.
32Adam Bear and Joshua Knobe (2017). “Normality: Part descriptive, Part prescriptive”. In: Cognition 167,
pp. 25–37.
21
moral permissibility of an action. In judging an explanation for a moral decision-making
outcome based on an act-utilitarian solution, I have reasons to resist such an explanation
due to disagreements with the style of reasoning for evaluating the moral permissibility of
this act. Going back to Nora’s example, suppose that the algorithm takes five measurable
features of Nora into account, and finds correlations between the input features and the
decision outcome. The correlations make up the explanation for why a decision outcome
is achieved. Let us imagine an institution that has strong reasons to believe that Nora
has a feature such as dignity, relevant to the decision-making context, and that dignity is
incommensurable with the quantified input features required by the deep supervised learning
for its decision-making. The institution then disagrees with the relevant explanation for why
Nora is rejected due to the mismatch between its background assumptions (dignity as a non-
quantifiable feature relevant to the decision-making context) and the algorithm assumption
that the salient features to decision-making are all quantifiable and are input features to the
algorithm.
More generally, the empirical and mathematical aspects for why a decision outcome is
achieved are interpreted against some background assumptions held by the audiences of
explanations. Some disagreements with an explanation for a decision outcome in a sensitive
context due to the background assumptions of the audience of explanations reveal some moral
or social mismatch about algorithmic decision-making between the receiver of an explanation
and its producer. The fact that background assumptions impact explanatory judgements
motivate why I tackle the interpretability of explanation as a separate, yet closely related
issue to explanation. If one does not have a proper level of knowledge about the relevant
precedent assumptions, one might not have the capacity to judge and interpret an explanation
of a decision. The interpretability of explanations has a significant practical value for revealing
the explicit and the implicit reasons about why a decision-making procedure and process is
chosen.
A schema for the interpretability of explanations aims to capture various precedent as-
sumptions that become relevant in context-dependent evaluation of each kind of AI expla-
nation for why a decision outcome is achieved. Back to the example of Nora, here are a
list of moral and social considerations tied into technical aspects of algorithmic decision-
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making: Why does the algorithm merely observe Nora’s quantified attributes relevant to
decision-making? That is, what legitimizes the reductive-to-quantities representation of
Nora’s attributes, relevant to the hiring context? Why does an amalgamation of statistical
and optimization-based reasoning decide about Nora’s hire? Why is this learning algorithm
used rather than one more favourable to Nora? If the algorithm is justified, why these rather
than those (hyper-)parameters? Why does a training data set about others influence Nora’s
condition? That is, why does this training data set, rather than another (with having a
different error distribution), impact Nora’s condition?)
Associated with the structural explanation, there is an interpretative level which en-
compasses several assumptions for the acceptability of the reduction of the salient features
of a decision-making problem to quantifiable measures. Statistical explanations are evalu-
ated against drawing a distinction between statistical (and optimality) reckoning vs. non-
statistical judgements, and the acceptability of statistical (and optimality) reckoning is tied
to background assumptions for this legitimacy. Correlational explanations must be evaluated
against various interventionist goals and norms: why there is a correlation, say, between
Nora’s ethnicity and why she is rejected for the employment position. Associated with causal
explanations, there are some assumptions concerning the appropriateness of using causal dis-
covery algorithms relevant to a kind of a decision-making problem. Example-based explana-
tions are judged and evaluated against background assumptions such as the appropriateness
and inclusiveness of the set of training data.
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Figure 6: A conceptual framework for AI explainability-interpretability
The hierarchical framework of explainability and interpretability, illustrated in Figure 6,
suggests a comprehensive standard for assessment of the social, moral, and political aspects
to which algorithmic decision-making pertains.
For instance, there is an increasing amount of discussion on the ethical and social im-
plications of AI and algorithmic decision-making. One principled way to bring focus to this
discussion is to benefit from the significance of the types of AI explanations for why an out-
come is achieved. Mapping the AI explanations on the implicitly endorsed assumptions in
critical and sensitive algorithmic decision-making contexts triggers the discussion on whether
the algorithmic decision-making for a specific social domain is aligned with some endorsed
moral values or not. I have used Nora’s hiring problem as a running example in order to
convey the importance of each element of AI explanations. The usefulness of the frame-
work illustrated in Figure 6 applies more generally, to algorithmic decision-making in other
sensitive domains such as criminal recidivism and medical diagnosis.
First, the most global level of the explanatory hierarchy corresponds to the mathematical
and quantifiable definition of the relevant elements of the decision problem. As discussed
in Section 2.1, deep supervised learning algorithms employ artificial neural networks with
multiple hidden layers to represent the relevant aspects of the decision task. Whether or not
the combination of nodes, arcs, their associated weights, the activation functions, and the
past historical data can fully capture the relevant elements engaged in a particular decision-
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making problem is a legitimate question that requires a careful investigation.
Second, a statistical explanation sheds light on the average behavior of a population
sample. Hence, by definition statistical information and inferences are about group behaviors.
For instance, the law of large numbers and the central limit theorem hold true only for a
large data corpus, rather than a single individual. Hence, the decision outcomes that are
obtained from statistical facts suffer from limitations concerning the explanation of why a
decision, at an individualistic level, is obtainable. More specifically, there is a hard question
about why a highly probabilistic outcome justifies the decision result at an individualistic
level. I do not suggest that statistical limitations are always problematic. We use such
inferences all the time, and indeed the contemporary scientific inquiry is based on this mode
of reasoning. The correspondence between the second level of the explanatory hierarchy
and its associated background assumptions presses the importance of highlighting reasons
about why to adopt statistical reckoning vs. non-statistical judgement in context-sensitive
decision-making problems.
Third, the correlational explanations suggest information about relevant features in the
decision-making problem, but these explanations might not be fully illuminating, given that
the choices of mathematical elements determine why a decision outcome is achieved. They
do not provide a deeply convincing argument for why a decision should be made; rather, they
make inferences about a particular case, based on how some random variables in a training
data set are correlated. The correlational explanations also pave the way for discovering
causal information from a set of data.
Fourth, in the context of machine learning, causal information is extracted, according to
some strong assumptions about our prior probabilistic knowledge. The information about
probabilistic causality are acquired from correlational information embedded in the obser-
vational data. The causal information that is extracted, by methods such as do-calculus, is
model-dependent.33 They mainly have significant value for interventions.
Fifth, example-based explanations reveal some information about a decision context.
They might manifest counterfactual information, or just contrastive information.
An example-based explanation for why my credit card application is rejected might be
33Judea Pearl and Dana Mackenzie (2018). The book of why: the new science of cause and effect. Basic Books.
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that if I have had the age and salary of John, my application would have been approved.
These explanations might be understandable by lay people, but they do not deeply show
why a decision outcome based on some rules take place. Keeping the level of discussion at
searching for a minimal information that is understandable by lay people might allow private
sectors to hide more important information that is the true main reason for why a decision
outcome is achieved.
5 Conclusion
Due to the fact that algorithmic decision-making has the potential to affect detrimentally
individual or collective human rights and situations, the AI explanations deserve more signif-
icant analysis than those systems, using decision-making algorithms to process simply objects.
In this paper, I proposed a hierarchical framework for the explainability and interpretability
of AI, by enumerating a variety of explanations. The proposed framework provides a plat-
form to bring some systematic focus to the many kinds of questions we might ask about deep
decision-making in sensitive contexts. Some argue that the interpretability and explainability
of AI has been motivated by generating post-hoc explanations that are understandable by
lay people. I resist this narrow conception of explainability and interpretability for sensitive
decision contexts. To be clear, I do not claim that in all decision contexts, the aforementioned
levels of explanation and their corresponding elements of interpretation are relevant. For in-
stance, on classifying the images of a cat, the relevant explanation-interpretation discussion
can significantly be shortened. On the other hand, using a deep supervised learning algorithm
for hiring employees or criminal recidivism demands a more elaborate clarification of the as-
pects of algorithmic decision-making. The conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 6 has
enough resources to capture these elements. Moreover, paying attention to the background
normative assumptions provides insights for computer scientists into how to operationalize
AI explanations.
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